



Corporate acquisitions, either through hostile
takeovers or through negotiated mergers, have
increased dramatically in recent years. Acquisi-
tion activity appears particularly intense in
industries undergoing structural changes
induced by changes in regulation or in technol-
ogy. The recent increase in merger acquisition
activity in the banking industry is a prominent
example. From 1980 through 1984, there were
1,961 bank acquisitions. Moreover, assets of
acquired banks during this period totaled $174
billion, representing an approximately five-fold
increase in banking assets acquired over the
1975 through 1979 period.
The increase in acquisition activity generally
and the increase in the number of acquisitions
within particular industries, such as banking, has
raised concerns regarding the acquisition or
takeover process itself as well as concerns over
whether acquisitions impair economic perfor-
mance by reducing the overall level of competi-
tion within an industry.
The purpose of this Letter is to review empirical
evidence concerning the gains realized by
shareholders in recent bank acquisitions. Two
issues are examined. The first concerns the
source of merger related gains, and the second
concerns how competition among potential
acquirers affects the division of gains between
the acquired and acquiring firms. Evidence from
the banking industry on these issues provides
insights concerning the nature of competition
within the acquisition market generally and has
implications for regulatory reform of the acquisi-
tion process.
Takeover process
Concerns over the takeover process have
focused on the degree of public disclosure
regarding a takeover bid and the time period any
bid must be outstanding. Current federal legisla-
tion, embodied in the Williams Act passed in
1968, requires an acquirer to disclose within 10
days a purchase of 5 percent or more of the tar-
get firm's shares, its business plans concerning
the acquisition, and its sources of financing. The
Williams Act also requires that offers remain
open for at least ten days; that is, once a tender
offer has been made (i.e., an offer to buy a block
of the target firm's shares), shareholders must be
provided at least ten days to decide whether to
tender their shares.
The purported intent of the Williams Act is to
protect target shareholders by providing them
with more information about the acquirer and
by giving them more time to decide whether to
sell their shares. More time, it is argued, would
protect target shareholders by promoting greater
competition among other potential bidders dur-
ing the acquisition process.
Recent legislation introduced in the Senate
would expand the Williams Act by requiring
quicker disclosure of a 5 percent interest in a
target firm and by placing restrictions on addi-
tional stock purchases after a 5 percent interest
is obtained (a two-day waiting period is pro-
posed). Whether reform of the takeover process
is needed and whether acquisitions enhance
economic performance depend in large part on
the sources of merger-related gains and the
nature of competition within the acquisition
market.
Gains from acquisitions
A useful measure of expected gains from an
acquisition is the change in the prices of shares
of the acquired or target firm and the acquiring
or bidding firm around the announcement of an
acquisition. Share prices should reflect current
and future anticipated returns to shareholders
associated with the merger and therefore
provide a measure of the market's assessment of
the expected change in the combined firms'
cash flows.
In a recent study, Peggy Wier and this author
examined 40 acquisitions that occurred during
the period 1974 through 1985 involving banks
with actively traded shares. The average return
for shareholders of the acquired bank around theFRBSF
announcement date of the acquisition was 15
percent. Acquiring bank shareholders, in con-
trast, experienced on average a small decrease
in their stock price of about 1 percent around
the announcement date. In dollar terms, for the
40 acquisitions examined, the combined market
value of the acquired and acquiring bank
increased an average of $11 million (or approx-
imately 2 percent of their combined pre-merger
market value.)
Two conclusions can be drawn from this evi-
dence. First, bank acquisitions are value-
enhancing transactions as indicated by the
increase in the combined market value of the
acquired and acquiring banks. This implies that
the gains realized by acquired banks are not
simply offset by losses by the acquiring bank,
but rather result from higher expected cash flows
for the combined entity. Second, acquisitions
are, on average, zero-gain propositions for the
acquiring bank.
The results for the banking industry, in terms of
the returns to acquiring and acquired firms, are
virtually identical to the results obtained from
other studies of horizontal acquisitions (i .e.,
acquisitions involving firms in the same industry)
and corporate acquisitions generally. For exam-
ple, in a recent study of over 100 horizontal
mergers, Espen Ecbo found that the share price
of acquired firms increased an average of 14
percent around the announcement of the
acquisition; the acquiring firms experienced no
significant increase in value.
Sources of gains
While bank acquisitions appear to be value-
enhancing, the desirability of acquisition activity
from asocietal view depends on the source of
acqUisition-related gains. Various explanations
for the observed gains have been advanced. For
example, reductions in production or distribu-
tion costs, called synergies, could occur through
the realization of scale or scope economies.
Acquisitions, particularly hostile takeovers,
could eliminate an inefficienttarget firm's man-
agement and thereby improve the target firm's
performance. Finally, acquisitions could
increase monopoly power in product markets.
Which of these potential explanations is correct
has important public policy implications. For
example, if acquisitions in banking were to
result in increased monopoly power and higher
prices for banking services, then, while they may
benefit the acquired firm, acquisitions would
reduce overall societal welfare.
One way to determine whether the gains
observed in bank acquisitions are the result of
higher anticipated monopoly profits, is to exam-
ine the stock price reaction of banks competing
with the newly merged bank. If the acquisition is
expected to facilitate collusion amongbanksin
a particular market, the price of banking services
could be expected to increase. The increase in
the price of bank services should benefit both
the merged banks as well as their competitors.
Based on this reasoning, the stock price ofthe
competing or rival banks should increase around
the announcement date of the acquisition if the
acquisition were expected to increase monopoly
power.
For the acquisitions studied, no significant
increase was observed in the value of competing
banks' shares around the announcement of the
acquisition. It is interesting to note that there
was no change over the 1974 through 1985
period in the stock price reaction of rival banks.
As discussed in a recent Letter (December 26,
1986), antitrust standards for bank acquisitions
have become more lenient in recent years. Nev-
ertheless, the relaxation of these standards
apparently has not resulted in acquisitions that
increase monopoly power.
Determinants of the division of gains
A second issue concerns how competition
among acquiring or bidding firms affects the
division of gains between the target and the
acquiring firm. The effect of competition among
bidders on the division of gains has important
public policy implications. In particular, critics
of the Williams Act and proposed extensions of
that legislation argue that such laws promote
competition for a target's shares after the target
has been identified by a bidder (promoting so
called "auctioneering"). The increased competi-
tion among bidders, while raising the price
stockholders of the acquired firm receive for
their shares, lowers the returns the acquiring
firm receives. Lower returns for acquiring firms
will, it is argued, reduce the incentives of poten-
tial acquirers to search out acquisition
candidates.
Whether promoting an auction for a target firm's
shares will redistribute gains from the acquirer to
the acquired firm will depend on at least two
factors: (a) the extent to which the gains from an
acquisition are generated by resources unique toa specific bidder, such as a unique location or
management team, and (b) the extent to which
information revealed when a bid is announced
can be appropriated by other bidders(or the tar-
get). These two factors determine the degree to
which bidders are potential competitors for a
given target firm. The greater the degree of sub-
stitutability among bidders the more likely it is
that promoting an auction will reduce the
returns acquiring firms receive.
A problem in determining the effect of competi-
tion among bidders on the division of gains is
the difficulty of obtaining an accurate measure
of the intensity of competition among bidders.
The observed number of participants in an
acquisition attempt probably does not measure
rivalry very precisely because, for one, the initial
bid price may be high enough to discourage oth-
ers from participating in the contest. The poten-
tial participants therefore are never publicly
identified. Another reason is that a merger may
result from an unpublicized contest involving
several active parties.
In light of this problem, acquisitions in banking
provide a unique opportunity to examine how
competition among potential bidders affects the
division of gains. Bank acquisitions can provide
insights into this issue because banking is sub-
ject to a unique set of regulatory constraints that
greatly facilitate the identification of potential
bidder and alternative target firms for a particu-
lar acquisition. Specifically, the Bank Holding
Company Act as amended in 1970 and the
National Banking Act (and current state banking
laws), generally require that the acquirer of a
commercial bank also be a commercial bank or
bank holding company. Acquisitions are also
restricted geographically by the combination of
federal and state laws limiting interstate as well
as intrastate acquisition (e.g., branching laws).
By identifying the number of potential bidders or
alternative targets for a particular acquisition,
competition within the banking acquisition mar-
ket can be measured. If potential bidding firms
can be substituted for one another, one would
expect to see smaller returns to acquiring firms
in acquisitions involving a larger number of
potential bidders. If target firms were substituta-
ble, one would expect to see smaller returns to
acquired firms in acquisitions involving a larger
number of alternative targets.
The number of potential bidders and alternative
targets was calculated for 40 bankacquisitions.
A potential bidder was defined as any bank
larger than the acquired bank, which, under pre-
vailing state and federal laws, was permitted to
purchase the acquired bank. An alternative tar-
get was defined as a bank of approximately the
same size and located in the same geographical
area as the acquired bank.
The findings ofJames and Wier's study indicate
that competition among potential bidders as
well as among alternative target banks affects
the division of gains in bank acquisitions. The
greater the number of potential bidders and the
fewer the number of alternative targets, the
larger the return to the acquired bank and the
smaller the return to the acquiring bank. This
finding implies a degree of substitutability
between bidders and alternative targets.
It is also interesting to note that the number of
potential bidders and targets in an acquisition
influences only how the gains are divided
among participants and not the total dollar value
change resulting from the acquisition.
Conclusion and implications
Two important findings emerge. First, competi-
tion among both potential bidders and alterna-
tive targets affects the division of acquisition-
related gains. More bidders implies that the
acquired bank's shareholders will realize a
greater proportion of the gains from an acquisi-
tion. Second, the gains from the bank acquisi-
tions studied do not appear to result from
expected increases in monopoly power but
rather from gains anticipated from geographical
expansion synergies in production.
These findings have implications for the current
debate concerning the regulation of the acquisi-
tion process. Regulations intended to promote
competition among potential acquirers for a
given target firm are likely to reduce the profits
the acquiring firm receives. A smaller share
accruing to the acquiring firm could imply a
reduction in the amount of acquisition activity,
and impede an efficient reallocation of corpo-
rate assets.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments' 2 206,975 1,583 4,002 2.0
Loans and Leases' 6 184,016 1,727 2,236 1.1
Commercial and Industrial 53,147 474 1,241 2.3
Real estate 69,516 259 2,675 3.7
Loans to Individuals 36,685 8 - 4,446 - 10.8
Leases 5,405 9 - 116 - 2.1
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 16,034 168 5,331 49.8
OtherSecurities2 6,924 - 311 - 444 - 6.0
Total Deposits 214,619 11 ,148 3,610 1.7
Demand Deposits 60,073 9,875 4,137 7.3
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 39,896 4,795 - 11,549 - 22.4
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,859 949 3,397 20.6
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,687 325 - 3,923 - 2.8
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,604 211 - 2,506 - 5.3
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 31,726 - 537 - 4,590 - 12.6
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,995 - 147 - 383 - 1.5
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











, Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities'
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change